Cosmic Conservative

Rational Conservatism from the heart of America

Life, Intelligence, Choice and Will

By CosmicConservative
Or maybe I should just have titled this "Life, The Universe and Everything". I just finished Kurzweil's "Singularity" book and find much in it to be fascinating, but I noticed something in his writing of it that makes me wonder how many people share what appear to be his key assumptions. One of his major themes in the book, in fact the most profound theme, is that in the next few decades human life will be transcended by artificial intelligences. He does a solid job of supporting this assertion with facts, figures, quotations from major technology figures, projections based on historical progress, etc. His final assertion is that such intelligent machines will essentially be "human" in every meaningful way that we mean the word "human", primarily meaning that they will "think," will appreciate art, and will have all the subtle nuances of humans in social interactions. In fact he thinks they will vastly outstrip human capabilities even in these areas in a remarkably short time (a few decades). One of the key points he tries to make is that once we make machines "intelligent" enough, we've essentially made them "alive", meaning he is equating "intelligence" with "life." This seems a bit of an odd approach to take since everyone agrees that bacteria are "life" but nobody considers them "intelligent." So I'm pretty sure that something can be "alive" without being "intelligent", and there is no reason I can think of to assert that the reverse could also be true, that something could be "intelligent" but not be "alive." In fact we can do a thought experiment right here to explore the relative differences between "alive" and "intelligent." And we can use the "Turing Test" to demonstrate that proving something to be of human intelligence doesn't necessarily prove it is "alive." Imagine a massively parallel digital supercomputer with access to every bit of data on the internet. Imagine it to have a billion-line software program written from a reverse-engineering of the human brain, and for the purpose of this thought experiment, imagine it to be accurate to within .005% of an actual human brain. Now, have someone ask it, and a human genius, a series of questions, some extemporaneous in nature to preclude the possibilitiy of the computer being able to look up the question and provide a rote, but reasonable, response. In this thought experiment, let us conclude that a series of these tests proves that the human genius and the computer are indistinguishable to the blind question asker. In other words, it passes not just the simple Turing test, but the "Genius Turing Test." Now, that would prove, according to current accepted standards (the "Turing Test") that the computer is intelligent. But that's all it proves. Now, imagine that we could run this experiment in such a way that we control all initial conditions and all variables. After running the experiment once, if we give the supercomputer exactly the same initial conditions and exactly the same questions in exactly the same order, then if the super computer responded exactly the same each time, we could conclude that the computer was undoubtedly exhibiting "intelligence" but that it was of a completely deterministic variety. Which would indicate that the supercomputer, for all its power, intellegence and complexity, was still essentially a "machine" which responded deterministically to its environment in exactly the same way a rock falls in a gravitational field. Now, after having done that, we could introduce some sort of randomness to the computer's response. Let's say, for example, that we introduce a quantum device that returns a truly random result exactly comparable to flipping a coin. Now we put a rule in the computer's vastly complex decision-making tree that says "If any decision has two paths that are within .05% of each other in the decision making step, then instead of automatically taking the highest path, flip the coin and take one or the other based on the coin flip result." This would change the results of the test, perhaps only slightly, but perhaps profoundly, depending on the question. Say, for example, the question is "how did the universe begin" and the computer's search revealed that 39.333% of its answers were "The Big Bang" and 39.332% were "God Created it", then the answer the computer would give to the question "How did the universe begin" would be "God made it" 50% of the time and "The Big Bang" 50% of the time. Obviously we can take this introduction of randomness to any level that we want to, but this is sufficient for this thought-experiment. Now, doing this has demonstrated that an "intelligent" answer to a question can be different, and a system that answers differently based on purely random events would still pass the "Turing Test" each time, even if it provides different answers. We could call this random effect a manifestation of "choice". From an external perspective there would be no way to determine why one choice was made, but the effect of the choice would be clear in certain cases. But this sort of "choice" is based on pure randomness, so the question of whether the computer is "alive" is still not compelling enough to answer "yes." And this is where "will" comes in. When we speak of "will" we are speaking of an entity making a choice based on something beyond deterministic or random processes. We understand "will" to be the manifestation of purpose. I make a choice because I want to affect the outcome, not because I am reacting to inputs. When Kurzweil says that his intelligent machines will "transcend humans" he is assuming that they will manifest the property of "will". Which brings us back to the bacteria. Anyone who has watched bacteria move around in a petri dish knows that they are alive. Their movements demonstrate that they are alive. And they demonstrate life by not being purely reactive to the environment. The movement is primarily predicated on stimuli, but not always. So this has caused some natural philosophers to speculate that even bacteria exhibit the property of "will," however rudimentary that may be. And so they assert that "will" is a purely biological phenomenon completely separate from "intelligence." This is a crucial question for the science of AI. If we are creating fantastically sophisticated automata, that is different from creating life. Kurzweil has a chapter on his critics, and most of the criticisms he spends any significant time on boil down to this fundamentally "bio-centric" argument, which essentially says that no matter how much a computer appears to be alive, no matter how "intelligent" it might be, it is still a machine, not a living thing. I'm not so sure about this. Since we don't know what the source of "will" is, I think it is a bit anthropomorphic to assert that it comes from cellular activity of some sort. But I'm not sure how we can ever know, since there is no way I know of to prove that will exists even for humans, and that has been debated for centuries already.

Comments (5)

qwerty182764
Okay. This is a long post. Might need several sections. Well, I don't want to press the point or hurt anyone's belief in the meaningfullness of life. That is not my intention at all! Rather, I'm merely trying to argue that life's meaning doesn't necessarily have to be coupled with indefiniteness or randomness. Furthermore, I'm not attempting to deny will, but the necessity of will being undefineable or nondeterministic. (Which is basically what non-determinism requires. You mentioned quantum physics. Doesn't quantum randomness arise because we can't define certain attributes of particles?) First of all, I can't really figure out what people are going for when they want will to be undetermined, yet responsive to the world (a contradiction?). You referred to something "beyond" randomness or determinism. But I can't see any other alternative to the two. Either you have an action arising from somewhere (reacting to inputs, determinism), or you have an action arising from nowhere (randomness). Actions arising from nowhere, on an elemental level, cannot contain direction from the universe (or they would be determined!). They contain no information. The only way an action can make sense in terms of the universe, contain information, can actually be a response to something (what I consider meaningful), is if, somewhere in the decision chain, it's taking input from the universe. (I'm not denying the possibility for coupling randomness to a deterministic set of rules. You alluded to this when describing your hypothetical levels of mechanical-ness of your AIs). I just don't see that as adding anything but noise to a system. If meaning is to arise, doesn't it have to arise in terms of something? Let's go back to your example of the deterministic and undeterministic AI. One of them is almost the same as the other. You've just added a "refer to random number generator" in between a few simulated neurons. In terms of the behavior of the simulated system, one would give answer A every time you prompt it with information set I. The other would give answer A most of the time, but answer B occasionally. But this isn't really so much because of it's intelligence or thought process (or will), as because you're fuzzing it up with the random number generator. Not all information sets I are really information set I, due to the seperate random input. On account of the randomness, we really aren't running the same situation/intelligence/will over again. Basing the meaningfullness of life on whether someone in some perspective outside of what we consider time, could run our world forwards and backwards and get the same result, seems a little precarious. If someone tomorrow were to discover a way around Heisenberg, and once again close a gap in our knowledge, allowing the arbitrary resolution of particle states; and we could predict (though, presumably at great cost) just when a barrier penetration event would occur, ect, ect .... does that mean all of a sudden that all our experience, all our hopes, fears, acheivements, struggles, everything that we love, must not have meant anything to us after all? It was all worth it, until someone demonstrated that the path our world takes can, in principle, be predicted? That's just nuts. If you're looking for the meaning of life in sub-atomic particle physics, IMO, you're looking in the wrong place.
qwerty182764
Let's try another example: Suppose we have an insanely powerful computer (a few hundred billion factorial times as powerful as what we have available now) that we could simulate an entire planet on to the molecular level with high fidelity. Since we don't want the world to be boring, we make it an earthlike one. But we simulate it using pure classical physics. (Classical electrodynamics, thermodynamics, chemistry, ect...) No terms for randomness added. Information set I really is information set I. A really = A. Life (or something like it. That computer definitely is going on my christmas list. :D ) eventually arises on this world. If it develops along lines anywhere similar to our own, then it would presumably develop desires and goals, needs and wants, motives branching and developing from the original motive to survive, a will of it's own, if you will. (The basic "will" to survive is a necessary precondition for that life to develop, given its need to reproduce and sustain itself) Even though if we, the exterior watchers of this world, rewound and re-ran it from a previous information set, and observed the same trajectory; would you then claim that this world doesn't mean anything to the inhabitants? Why does our knowledge or opinion of their world need to factor into the meaning that they derive from it? If we lobbed a simulated asteroid at their simulated world, wouldn't we cause a lot of chaos and grief for them? If we pricked them, would they not bleed? If we rewound and pricked them again in the exact same way, would they not bleed again in the exact same way? Okay - this is why you can't trust me with godlike powers. :D (Auxilliary questions that I won't have time to fully explore: If we got bored and stopped running the simulation, would it matter to the inhabitants of that world? Does time stop for them, or from their perspective, do the same laws continue to operate? If someone on the other side of our universe simulated the same physics/initial conditions on their supercomputer, got the same events, ect, would it be a different world or the same one? After all, you can run something like the mandelbrot set on every computer in the world, and get the mandelbrot set (to some finite fidelity). You could almost say that the existence of the mandelbrot set is not dependent on the existence of the simulating computer anymore than the existence of a triangle is dependent on the existence of human users of the principle.) You protested that determinism implies that we have no control over the world. That we are just along for the ride, with no ability to influence it one way or the other. Our wills are an illusion. The inhabitants of this hypothetical simulated world certainly do have wills and desires of their own. Presumably their history is as dependent on their actions as ours is on ours. But my catch is this: Their wills and desires exist in terms of their world. They aren't a seperate consideration. They arise from somewhere, and the somewhere that they arise from is within their own world. The control that they exert on their world is prompted by their will, which is an element of that same world, arising from that same world, sans random noise. If we were to add random noise, we certainly wouldn't be able to get the same result multiple times in a row, or predict it's behavior, but aside from that, the wills of the respective creatures involved are still elements of their world, arising from their world, now with the noise added. I really don't see the difference between the two worlds in terms of the meaning that their hypothetical creatures derive from them.
qwerty182764
"And this is where “will” comes in. When we speak of “will” we are speaking of an entity making a choice based on something beyond deterministic or random processes. We understand “will” to be the manifestation of purpose. I make a choice because I want to affect the outcome, not because I am reacting to inputs." Well, like I said, I half agree. But "I" is a member of the world. "Want" is a complicated interaction between "I" and the world. "Affect the outcome" is a proposed action taken by "I" on the world. And the inputs inherent in all this are distributed between the world and "I". I would say that your will is a subcomponent of "I".
CosmicConservative
qwerty: I'll try to respond to both of your posts: You assert that an action has only two possible sources. A: It is a response to events. B: It arises from out of nowhere. I would say that there is at least a third option. C: It is the result of will. That's what will is. Will is the ability to affect change in the universe APART from pure response to events, or arising from pure randomness. It is the motive force of creation. It is what makes decision making meaningful. If the only options are that the choice is determined by the inputs, or there is some external randomness applied, then what is the point of the event? In both of the cases you describe there is no "choice" A means that the universe is a metaphorical videotape, B means that you are at the mercy of random chance. In both of those cases your path has absolutely nothing to do with your consciousness. The whole concept of "will" is predicated on the supposition that an individual consciousness can make a choice, and that consciousness is responsible for that choice. I agree that there is no philosophical difference between purely deterministic paths, and paths that are purely affected by random chance. That's my whole point. It is only when your conscious will is involved that the choices matter. I am not basing the meaning of life on whether someone outside our time could run our universe backwards and forward and get the same result. That is merely a demonstration that the universe is predetermined. I'm saying that if every action we take in our lives is pre-ordained by all the events that went before, then the entire history of the universe was defined in the initial conditions of the universe and there is nothing willful about it. That makes it philosophically unappealing to me. I want to believe that my life has meaning and that the choices I make in life will impact my future. And that is only possible if I can MAKE choices in the first place. I've already demonstrated logically that a deterministic universe is one in which choice is at best an illusion. Yes, if it could be proven that the universe was deterministic, then I believe that the proof pretty much makes the universe meaningless. In total. I'm not interested in such a universe because such a universe has no purpose except to play itself out from beginning to end just like a videotape. That's why I keep referring to such a universe as a "metaphorical videotape." First it strongly implies that my "consciousness" itself is just an illusion, which just makes the universe less meaningful, but even if my consciousness is somehow 'along for the ride' (which Jung seemed to believe) then it is merely at the mercy of the videotape, and all of my experiences are beyond my control, so in that sense it's like being pushed into a videotape. Now, I suppose you could say that such a universe might serve a purpose if you played out your role, and returned to a DIFFERENT universe where the lessons you learned by being stuck in the videotape might have meaning, but that could only be true if that universe was not deterministic, in which case this universe has meaning only as a sort of training ground for the real universe. In other words the other universe is the REAL universe and this one is just a simulation for the purpose of teaching us lessons. I'm fine with that, but then all of my arguments apply to that other universe instead since that's the real one. Your example of a world that is built along purely classical physics laws is one that is not likely to have generated life in the first place, so I don't accept the validity of your analogy. But assuming that we could somehow get past that fundamental problem, then the people who "live" on that planet are not really people, they are simulations. And they don't really have any choices, so they have no will. So any "meaning" they derive from the experience is pointless since they had no say in the events of their lives anyway, they were merely automatons following a script. I don't think you and I are going to find common ground on this if you insist that the illusory and fictional "wills" of automatons are meaningful. That's precisely what I am saying I find philosophically unacceptable. You can argue that such universes, planets and lives have meaning because the automatons who live there have been programmed to think and feel they have meaning, but I will continue to assert that to be pointless in the end. If there is no will, no creative force that we can apply to affect the universe from our pure desire to do so, then we are simply not responsible for our actions, the universe is nothing but a wind-up toy and I'm simply not interested in being a cog in a wheel, no matter how cleverly the programmers were in making my own script include pain, joy or disinterest. In fact I would say that any entity that would program, or even watch, a system such that conscious entities were allowed to feel such profound pain and suffering for events they were predetermined to encounter with no hope of avoidance is a pretty sadistic entity. "Hey, let's go run that 'universe' simulation again, I love it when the little critters are suffering!" I don't think I could stand to run it in the first place, and I'm just a pitiful little human.
Dadman
For what it's worth, I'm 100% behind Cosmic on this particular debate. I believe free will or agency is the 'active ingredient' in our universe. Without it, life, the universe, and everything else have no real meaning...